Medicare billing, law and practice: Complex, incomprehensible and beginning to unravel by Faux, M et al.
 1 
Medicare Billing, Law and Practice: Complex, Incomprehensible and Beginning to Unravel 
Faux, Wardle and Adams 
Medicare Billing, Law and Practice: Complex, 
Incomprehensible and Beginning to Unravel 
Margaret Faux, Jonathan Wardle and Jon Adams* 
Australia’s Medicare is still widely considered one of the world’s best health systems. 
However, continual political tinkering for 40 years has led to a medical billing and 
payment system that has become labyrinthine in its complexity and is more vulnerable 
to abuse now, from all stakeholders, than when first introduced. Continuing to make 
alterations to Medicare without addressing underlying structural issues, may 
compound Australia’s health reform challenges, increase the incidence of non-
compliance and expenditure and thwart necessary reforms to develop a modern, data-
driven, digitally informed health system. For the medical practitioners who are 
required to navigate the increasing complexity and relentless change, they will remain 
at high risk of investigation and prosecution in what has become an anarchic 
operating environment that they cannot avoid, but do not understand. 
Keywords: health care fraud and non-compliance; health system literacy; legal liability of medical 
practitioners; health Insurance 
INTRODUCTION 
The Nimmo report in 1969 described health insurance in Australia as “unnecessarily complex and 
beyond the comprehension of many”, and the report became the catalyst for the introduction of 
Australia’s first universal health coverage scheme, Medibank.1 This article suggests that Australia’s 
current health insurance arrangements have again become so complex and incomprehensible that the 
system is beginning to unravel. 
The authors have undertaken an extensive examination of core legal provisions of tax payer-funded 
medical billing arrangements under Australia’s public insurer, Medicare, and to the best of our 
knowledge this is the first time such a comprehensive review has been undertaken. It is suggested that 
continual political tinkering for 40 years has created a medical billing and payment system that has 
become labyrinthine in its complexity and is more vulnerable to abuse now than when first introduced. 
Further, continuing to make alterations to Medicare without addressing underlying structural issues may 
compound Australia’s health reform challenges, increase the incidence of non-compliance and 
                                                          
* Margaret Faux: PhD candidate, Faculty of Health, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. Dr Jonathan Wardle: Senior 
Lecturer, Faculty of Health, University of Technology Sydney, Australia; Visiting Professor, School of Medicine, Boston 
University; Trans-Pacific Fellow, School of Medicine, University of Washington. Professor Jon Adams: ARC Professorial Future 
Fellow, Professor of Public Health, Director, ARCCIM, Faculty of Health, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. 
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors. 
Competing interests statement: Margaret Faux is the founder and CEO of a medical billing company, and the holder of a patent 
for a medical billing app. Ms Faux’s company also provides online education on the topic of medical billing for medical 
practitioners. 
Correspondence to: margaret.a.faux@student.uts.edu.au. 
1 Australia, Commonwealth Committee of Enquiry into Health Insurance, JA Nimmo, Health Insurance, Report of the 
Commonwealth Committee of Enquiry (March 1969) 
<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22library/lcatalog/10134931%22>. 
 1 
expenditure, thwart necessary steps to develop a modern, data-driven digitally informed health system, 
and risk destroying what is widely considered one of the best health systems in the world.2 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Dr Frank Gaha was the only medical practitioner in the House of Representatives on the night of 9 April 
1946.3 To him the proposal to add 11 words into the Constitutional Amendment Bill represented little 
more than overzealous obsession on the part of the “legal gentlemen”. A few months later, on 28 
September 1946, one of the most successful referendums in Australian history led to the insertion of s 
51(xxiiiA) into the Australian Constitution4 including the verbiage which Gaha had thought redundant, 
“but not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription” (hereafter referred to as the CCC meaning 
civil conscription caveat).5 
Far from redundant, the CCC became a foundation on which Australia’s health system was built.6 The 
CCC prevented the full implementation of the National Health Service Acts of 1948,7 directly impacted 
upon many of the structural choices made by the Federal Government during the implementation of 
Australia’s original universal health insurance scheme, Medibank,8 and may be at the heart of many of 
the health reform challenges Australia is facing today.9 
Almost 70 years later, 38 High Court judges have settled three points of law (Table 1) in relation to the 
interpretation of the CCC as follows: 
(1) The relationship between a medical practitioner and patient is a contract, governed by general 
principles of contract law. 
(2) Both legal and practical compulsion may offend the CCC. 
(3) The CCC applies to medical and dental services only and not to other services described in s 
51(xxiiiA). 
Table 1 
Case Name No. of 
Judges 
                                                          
2 EC Schneider et al, Mirror, Mirror 2017: International Comparison Reflects Flaws and Opportunities for Better U.S. Health 
Care <https://interactives.commonwealthfund.org/2017/july/mirror-mirror/>. 
3 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 April 1946 
<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;db=HANSARD80;id=hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1
946-04-09%2F0151;orderBy=_fragment_number,doc_date-
rev;page=3;query=Dataset%3Ahansardr,hansardr80%20Decade%3A%221940s%22%20Year%3A%221946%22;rec=3;resCoun
t=Default>. 
4 The Social Services Referendum was passed nationally and in six States making it one of Australia’s most successful referendums 
<https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/a/australia/1946-referendum-australia.html>. 
5 An explanation by Robert Menzies, of the words “but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription” which he successfully 
proposed be inserted into the Constitution can be read at this link 
<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;db=HANSARD80;id=hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1
946-04-09%2F0149;orderBy=_fragment_number,doc_date-
rev;page=3;query=Dataset%3Ahansardr,hansardr80%20Decade%3A%221940s%22%20Year%3A%221946%22;rec=3;resCoun
t=Default>. 
6 Medicare’s enabling Legislation is the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). Despite its name, it is not a law for Insurance (discussed 
in this article) but a law enacted pursuant to the new s 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution, as a law for the provision of medical and 
dental services. From the outset, optometrical services were included. 
7 A-m Boxall and JA Gillespie, Making Medicare: The Politics of Universal Health Care in Australia (UNSW Press, 2013) 28, 
29. 
8 G Whitlam, Curtin Memorial Lecture 1961 <http://john.curtin.edu.au/jcmemlect/whitlam1961.html#anchor1597583>. 
9 Australia’s current out-of-pocket medical costs crisis has been attributed to the practical impact of the Constitution s 51(xxiiiA) 
<https://insidestory.org.au/healthcares-out-of-pocket-crisis/>. 
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British Medical Association v Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201 6 
General Practitioners Society of Australia v Commonwealth 145 CLR 532 7 
Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1987) 62 CLR 271 5 
Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226 7 
Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71* 
*Breen considered certain aspects the contractual relationship between doctor and patient, not 
s 51(xxiiiA) specifically 
6 
Wong v Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573; [2009] HCA 3 7 
Total 38 
Historical records suggest a political preference at the time of the introduction of Medibank to socialise 
medicine10 but this was problematic for the government because the CCC prevented (and still prevents) 
the Federal Government from implementing an NHS11 style of health system in which medical 
practitioners can be employed as public servants. This has effectively enshrined the small business nature 
of Australian medical practice, enabling medical practitioners to set fees as they wish. More recently, 
the CCC was described by the High Court as a rare constitutional guarantee which benefits both parties 
equally by preserving freedom of choice for consumers, who cannot be forced to have a required 
relationship with a medical practitioner without their consent.12 
Despite the seemingly impenetrable barrier imposed by the CCC, on 1 July 1975, the Federal 
Government successfully introduced Medibank (later Medicare), which provided health sector funding 
across two distinct domains, enabled by two separate sections of the Constitution: 
(1) the provision of free public hospital services via conditional federal grants made to State and 
Territory Governments under s 96,13 and 
(2) subsidised private services rendered by medical practitioners on a fee for service basis pursuant to 
laws made under s 51(xxiiiA). 
This structure, which endures today, has allowed the Federal Government to control State-run public 
hospitals indirectly and subsidise out-of-pocket costs for consumers accessing private sector services. 
Today, decisions concerning the interpretation of the CCC are being felt in the health reform space, 
where the need to control escalating federal health expenditure sits at odds with the unique position of 
power and privilege held by Australian medical practitioners who have constitutional protection against 
excessive government intrusion into the private contractual arrangements they negotiate with their 
patients. In short, if available rebates (whether from the government or other payers) are perceived as 
insufficient by an individual medical practitioner, subject to any contractual barriers, the medical 
practitioner has a constitutional right to charge any amount. 
                                                          
10 Whitlam, n 8. 
11 The National Health Service, known as the NHS, is the publicly funded Universal Health Coverage system in the United 
Kingdom. For more information visit this link <https://www.nhs.uk/>. 
12 Wong v Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573; [2009] HCA 3. 
13 Whitlam, n 8. 
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The original scheme included approximately one thousand subsidised services.14 Today there are almost 
six thousand, accessible by numerous providers and stakeholders beyond medical practitioners.15 
However, medical practitioners remain the largest group of Medicare-eligible providers16 and most are 
dependent on the scheme for their livelihoods.17 
In the 40 years since the scheme was introduced, the daily business of matching increasingly complex 
clinical encounters to the scheme’s administrative dataset has become much more difficult, and 
understanding the scheme’s requirements can sometimes be challenging. Further, despite the CCC, there 
are numerous circumstances in daily practice when medical practitioners cannot set their fees as they 
wish, and when charges cannot lawfully be raised against their patients, although they may not know 
this. Examples are presented in this article. 
THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF NON-COMPLIANT BILLING AND FRAUD 
Health expenditure in Australia and internationally is outpacing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth18 and the World Health Organization has stated that “Health systems haemorrhage money”,19 
citing 10 categories of waste, one being fraud and corruption.20 Some commentators have suggested that 
irrespective of system design, no health care system is safe from fraud due to inevitable regulatory gaps 
where inappropriate extraction of money from health funding pools can occur.21 In Australia, precise 
quantification of non-compliant Medicare billing has remained elusive, but one commentator has 
suggested deliberate misuse by medical practitioners costs taxpayers $2–3 billion annually or 10–15% 
of the schemes’ total cost.22 
In Australia, strategies to promote medical practitioner compliance have featured heavily in 
departmental reports,23 the most common being education programs designed to encourage voluntary 
compliance. This is then augmented with post-payment audit activity.24 
                                                          
14 The Medical benefits Schedule Book April 1974 with amendments to February 1975 
<http://www.mbsonline.gov.au/internet/mbsonline/publishing.nsf/Content/515793D58E889BD0CA257CD100033990/$File/197
4%20Apr%20MBS%20-%20AUS.pdf>. 
15 MBS Online, The April 2019 Medicare Benefits Schedule 
<http://www.mbsonline.gov.au/internet/mbsonline/publishing.nsf/Content/Downloads-201904>. 
16 MBS Online , n 15. 
17 Wong v Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573; [2009] HCA 3. 
18 World Health Organization, Public Spending on Health: A Closer Look at Global Trends 
<https://www.who.int/health_financing/documents/health-expenditure-report-2018/en/>. 
19 World Health Organization, Health Systems Financing: The Path to Universal Coverage <https://www.who.int/whr/2010/en/>. 
20 World Health Organization, n 19. 
21 J Gee et al, The Financial Cost of Healthcare Fraud, What Data from around the World Shows, 
http://www2.port.ac.uk/media/contacts-and-departments/icjs/ccfs/The-Financial-Cost-of-Healthcare-Fraud-Report-2015.pdf. 
22 T Webber, “What Is Wrong with Medicare?” (2012) 196(1) MJA 18. 
23 Australian National Audit Office, The Auditor-General, Department of Human Services, Medicare Compliance Audits, Audit 
Report No 26 (2013–2014) <https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/medicare-compliance-audits>. 
24 Australian National Audit Office, n 23. In 2008–2009 the federal government announced an “Increased Medicare Compliance 
Audit Initiative (IMCA)” which was designed to strengthen Medicare’s audit capabilities. The IMCA provided additional funding 
to enable increased compliance audits from 500 to 2500 annually. The work had been expected to generate savings of $147.2 
million over four years or $36.8 million per year. The net result was a $128.3 million shortfall in anticipated savings. These figures 
provide a useful basis from which to extrapolate a governmental approximation of $1.2 billion or approximately 6.8% of 
inappropriate Medicare claims annually. 
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Australian popular media often refer to non-compliant Medicare billing as “overservicing”25 or 
“rorting”26 neither of which has any legal meaning or relevance. The term “overservicing” was removed 
from Medicare’s regulatory framework in 1994,27 replaced with “inappropriate practice”.28 
The Medicare scheme is enabled by the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) (HIA), which is a law within 
the scope of the Federal Governments Financial Accountability framework and therefore, in addition to 
offences of inappropriate practice, offences under the HIA necessarily include sanctions under the 
Criminal Code Act  (Cth)29 where criminal fraud may be prosecuted for serious breaches of the scheme’s 
requirements. 
Both civil and criminal offences have been consistently reported since the inception of the scheme,30 and 
the majority of available commentary suggests that all incorrect claiming is fraudulent31 implying the 
perpetrator may have the necessary mens rea to act with deliberate intent to defraud. However, results 
of a recent study32 which found that Australian medical practitioners may not know (and have never 
been formally taught) how to bill correctly using Medicare, challenges this assumption. 
Irrespective of whether incorrect medical billing is intentional or not, in the current context of pressured 
health budgets and public expectations, the financial consequences of erroneous billing under Medicare 
have become a problem of sufficient magnitude that the question of how and why it is occurring can no 
longer be ignored. 
CONFUSION STARTS WITH THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 
Enforcement is only possible when concepts are clearly defined, either by the plain words and ordinary 
meaning of legislation or by judicial interpretation. Unfortunately, in the area of inappropriate practice 
and fraudulent breaches of the Medicare scheme, there is a relatively small body of case law and some 
key terms within the scheme are therefore important to consider, as they may themselves be possible 
root causes of non-compliant billing by medical practitioners. 
Use of the Term “Health Insurance” 
The original Medibank scheme was enabled by two Acts of Parliament: the HIA and the Health 
Insurance Commission Act 1973 (Cth).33 After major reforms to the Public Service sector in 2005, the 
Health Insurance Commission Act 1973 was superseded and is now the Human Services (Medicare) Act 
                                                          
25 J Medew, “Too Many Patients Receiving Unnecessary Medicine, Doctors Say”, The Age, 9 January 2017 
<https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/too-many-patients-receiving-unnecessary-medicine-doctors-say-20170109-
gtofmb.html>. 
26 N Evans, “Medicare Watchdog Claims $21m Back Over Medico Rorts”, PerthNow, 15 November 2018 
<https://www.perthnow.com.au/news/public-health/medicare-watchdog-claims-21m-back-over-medico-rorts-ng-b881022056z>. 
27 R Bell, Medicare Regulation through Professional Services Review – Lessons Learned 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/lwincntx23&div=21&id=&page=>. 
28 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 80. 
29 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 127, penalty for breach of s 20A. 
30 Bell, n 27. 
31 Webber, n 22; K Flynn, Medical Fraud and Inappropriate Practice in Medibank and Medicare, Australia 1975–1995. Doctor 
of Philosophy thesis, School of Social Sciences, Media and Communications, University of Wollongong, 2004. 
32 M Faux et al, “Who Teaches Medical Billing? A National Cross-sectional Survey of Australian Medical Education Stakeholders 
(2018) 8 BMJ Open e020712. 
33 RB Scotton and CR Macdonald, The Making of Medibank (University of New South Wales, School of Health Services 
Management, 1993). 
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1973 (Cth),34 but the HIA remains. The HIA sets out eligibility criteria, billing rules and contains 
mechanical provisions which facilitate the operation of the Medicare scheme. 
Despite its name, the HIA is not a law for the provision of insurance. The High Court has deemed it a 
law for the provision of medical and dental services pursuant to s 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution rather 
than a law pursuant to the insurance head of power, s 51(xiv).35 In contrast, the Private Health Insurance 
Act 2007 (Cth), defines “insurance” as having the meaning to which para 51(xiv) of the Constitution 
applies.36 
Over time, Australia has significantly expanded the original public health funding arrangements and 
now operates within a complex blended system of both public and private health financing. However, 
use of the term “insurance” to describe both public and private funding arrangements may be a subtle 
contributor to confusion in relation to understanding contractual obligations surrounding individual 
medical billing transactions. This is so because Australia’s public Medicare scheme cannot properly be 
described as a health insurance scheme as it does not carry out insurance business, a central feature of 
which is the issuing of contracts. Insurance law is in essence, the law of contract,37 where a binding 
contract of insurance exists between relevant parties. 
Consumer understanding of the term “insurance” is most relevant in areas such as motor vehicle 
insurance where common features of insurance contracts include; legal entitlement, uncertainty, 
insurable interest, voluntariness, the provision of money’s worth, no control by the party assuming the 
risk and the carrying out of insurance business which will usually include issuing premium and policy 
documents.38 While not an exhaustive list, it is evident that public health financing arrangements such 
as Medicare typically exclude some of these components, most obviously voluntariness. 
In Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (Peverill),39 the Australian High Court settled certain key 
issues concerning the legal nature of the Medicare benefit including when the benefit becomes payable 
and who has contracts with whom in the context of a Medicare billing transaction involving three parties 
– a patient, a provider of professional services (usually a medical practitioner) and the government. 
Legal Entitlement to the Medicare Benefit 
Peverill confirmed the existence of a contract between the medical practitioner and patient,40 but the 
HIA 41 did not give rise to a contract between the patient and the government42 nor between the medical 
practitioner and the government.43 The Court characterised the Medicare benefit not as a proprietary 
right44 but as a statutory gratuity payable to the patient,45 and a chose in action that may be acquired by 
the medical practitioner.46 Brennan J stated that Medicare benefits become payable immediately upon 
                                                          
34 Medicare Australia, Annual Report 2005–2006 (2006) 
<https://www.humanservices.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/medicare-annual-report-0506-complete.pdf>. 
35 Wong v Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573; [2009] HCA 3. 
36 Private Health Insurance Act 2007 (Cth) s 5.1. 
37 J Birds, Birds Modern Insurance Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th ed, 2013). 
38 Birds, n 37, 10–12. 
39 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
40 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
41 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
42 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
43 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
44 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
45 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
46 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
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claims being both lodged and accepted,47 but neither the patient nor the medical practitioner has a right 
to sue for unpaid Medicare benefits as no debt accrues to the benefit of either party. Further, payment of 
Medicare rebates is subject to government policy and the continuing will of the Parliament and may be 
altered or withdrawn any time.48 
Peverill also confirmed that the patient or “eligible person”49 is the exclusive beneficiary of Medicare 
benefits50 and that consent must be obtained from the eligible person before the benefit can be assigned 
to a provider of professional services. 
Therefore, for practical purposes, while medical practitioners can charge as they wish under the contracts 
they enter into with their patients, they cannot obtain the patient’s Medicare benefit until agreement is 
reached and consent given. This important inbuilt compliance mechanism is the only step in a medical 
billing transaction directly involving the patient. By requiring the patient’s signature to evidence consent, 
the billing of fictitious services and patient attendances is prevented and the patient is afforded an 
opportunity to review services itemised on the agreement. 
Provided for in s 20B, the assignor (the patient) must sign and retain a copy of the agreement,51 and s 
127 creates a strict liability offence if a copy of the signed agreement is not given to the patient.52 
However, the patient consent requirement is also anachronistic because Medicare has evolved to include 
many reimbursed services where the patient is not required to be physically present.53 Even when 
present, very few patients will today elect to retain paper copies of consent agreements, particularly as 
Medicare itself no longer requires practitioners to retain them either.54 
By diluting the signature requirement in this way it is arguable the Commonwealth has undermined the 
provisions of s 20B and exposed Medicare to increased vulnerability and misuse. One example is the 
use of Medicare to recover bad debts. There is now nothing to prevent a medical practitioner submitting 
an electronic bill to Medicare for an overdue private patient debt without the patient’s knowledge or 
consent, because neither party is required to retain the consent agreement. The medical record of the 
medical practitioner would usually provide evidence that the service took place but will provide no 
information concerning whether the billing was compliant.55 
A myriad of similar transaction level decisions are made every day by medical practitioners as they go 
about their daily work, and while current government statistics suggest high rates of bulk billing56 there 
is no mechanism available to test the veracity of the data because both intentional and unintentional 
misuse of bulk billing will usually not be visible.57 
                                                          
47 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
48 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
49 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
50 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226. 
51 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 20B. 
52 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 127. 
53 See, eg, Medicare Benefits Schedule, Case Conferences by Consultant Physician – (items 820 to 838, 6029 to 6034 and 6064 to 
6075) <http://www9.health.gov.au/mbs/fullDisplay.cfm?type=note&q=AN.0.51&qt=noteID&criteria=case%20conferences>. 
54 Department of Human Services, Assignment of benefit documents <https://www.humanservices.gov.au/organisations/health-
professionals/services/medicare/medicare-online-health-professionals>. 
55 For example, it is illegal to obtain the patient’s Medicare rebate and also charge a gap simultaneously (see the case of Sood 
below). But now, a patient could have paid $100 to the medical practitioner, still owe another $100, but because the patient has 
forgotten or has refused to pay the balance, the medical practitioner could simply unlawfully bill through Medicare to obtain the 
patient’s Medicare rebate. 
56 The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, Highest bulk-billing rate on record, 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/ministers/publishing.nsf/Content/health-mediarel-yr2018-hunt024.htm>. 
57 For example, a medical practitioner who mistakenly believes it is lawful to bulk bill a consultation and charge a separate $20 
administration fee is unlikely to come to Medicare’s attention even though the conduct is fraudulent. Medicare data will cite 
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What Is a “Medical Service?” 
During the 1946 Social Services Referendum the “YES” case put to Australians described the proposed 
constitutional change as applying to services provided by medical practitioners and dentists only.58 
However, when Medibank was introduced almost 30 years later, a small number of optometry services 
were included. The optometry profession had initially proposed that their new Medibank eligible 
services be described as relating to “specified conditions” rather than to “medical conditions”, but this 
was not acceded to on the basis that the correct description of all relevant subsidised services (noting the 
optometry services could also be provided by medically qualified ophthalmologists) under the new 
scheme was “medical conditions” which providers of medical services could provide. However, when 
the HIA was introduced, medical and dental services were grouped under a new term – “professional 
service” – though the reasons for this decision are unclear. One suggestion is that the inclusion of the 
optometrical services which were approved just 10 days before the scheme commenced necessitated a 
rushed decision regarding the need for an overarching term. The term “professional services” continues 
in use today, though it follows that the very fact of including optometrists from the outset means that 
providers of medical and dental services, described in s 51(xxiiiA), includes (and has always included) 
a wider class of persons than just medical practitioners and dentists, further, that a medical service itself 
has a wider meaning than being a service for treatment of a medical condition that only a medical 
practitioner can provide. Indeed today, the Medicare scheme subsidises 28 optometry services,59 
numerous services provided by a raft of allied health practitioners and nurses,60 and many of the more 
recently added “professional services” are services that neither medical practitioners nor dentists have 
the training or skills to provide, such as exercise physiology, physiotherapy, chiropractic and dietetics 
services. 
What Is a “Professional Service?” 
Section 3 of the HIA defines “professional service” as being a “clinically relevant service” and the 
subsequent definition of “clinically relevant service” includes necessity as an element. 
Interpretation of what constitutes a clinically relevant and necessary professional service is framed 
broadly to facilitate the art of medicine,61 ensuring medical practitioners are free to exercise appropriate 
clinical discretion on a case-by-case basis. This approach also aligns with a guiding principle described 
in the Health Practitioner National Law to enable innovation in service delivery.62 However, there may 
be a disconnect between the clinical skill set of medical practitioners and the administrative approach of 
Medicare, the ubiquitous effects of which permeate millions of decisions every day, ultimately impacting 
the corresponding billing transactions and health system spending. For medical practitioners, daily 
clinical decisions concerning whether a test or treatment is both clinically relevant and necessary will 
depend on numerous factors that may be poorly aligned with Medicare’s approach, including non-
clinical factors such as a perceived risk of subsequent litigation.63 
                                                          
evidence of an electronic bulk billed service, which on its own would not trigger alerts of impropriety. Patients are also unlikely 
to complain in such circumstances because by bulk billing, the medical practitioner has reduced their out of pocket expenses, only 
requiring nominal payments which most would assume to be legal. 
58 Wong v Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573; [2009] HCA 3 (Kirby J). 
59 Medicare Benefits Schedule Category 1, Group A10 services 
<http://www.mbsonline.gov.au/internet/mbsonline/publishing.nsf/Content/downloads>. 
60 Medicare Benefits Schedule, Category 8 services, n 59. 
61 The most famous author on the topic of the art of medicine was Sir William Osler, who was famously quoted as saying “The 
practice of medicine is an art not a trade: a calling, not a business: a calling in which your heart will be exercised equally with 
your head”: see <https://www.azquotes.com/author/11160-William_Osler>. The underlying principle posits that medical 
practitioners are guided by science, but treat patients as individuals. 
62 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld) s 2(f). 
63 For example – in the circumstances of a 50-y-o woman presenting with a two-day history of painful urination and fevers, and a 
past history of having had a kidney infection five years ago, it would be both clinically relevant and necessary to take a urine 
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The government has no ability to determine clinical relevance or necessity because it has no visibility 
over the reason why a patient attended a medical practitioner in the first place. Billing through Medicare 
requires the allocation of service codes only, which do not provide diagnostic information or describe 
presenting symptoms. This sits at odds with processes in some other countries where international 
disease codes are used at the start of the medical billing process to determine why the patient presented 
for medical treatment, which in turn provides necessary transparency for payers regarding the relevance 
and necessity of services rendered.64 
In addition, a lack of clarity around the parameters of what is included in a professional service has 
caused disagreement at the highest levels of the Australian judiciary where in one case (discussed below) 
the Court did not reach consensus and the resulting judgment left open the question of where a 
professional service begins and ends.65 This can be traced to the origins of the Medicare Benefits 
Schedule under which fees for professional services have always been arbitrarily allocated and do not 
relate to any formula or measure of work value where inclusions such as time taken, practice costs, 
consumables, cognitive and technical skill, physical effort and complexity might be defined. A large-
scale project seeking to address this important structural shortcoming was finalised by the Department 
of Health in 2000,66 however its recommendations were never implemented. 
A Notable Case 
The case of Sood v The Queen (Sood) demonstrates the potentially adverse impact that can follow when 
a medical practitioner is confused about the ambit of professional services and how to bill them correctly. 
Dr Sood was a medical practitioner who was found guilty in an original jury trial of 96 counts of 
Medicare fraud for billing to Medicare and simultaneously charging additional fees.67 On appeal the 
Court considered the meaning of three words in s 20A of the HIA – “in respect of” – and did not agree 
on the threshold issue of what came within the ambit of the professional service in that case.68 
Section 20A of the HIA provides that once an agreement between the medical practitioner and patient to 
direct bill has been made, the government rebate constitutes “full payment” for whatever comes within 
                                                          
sample for pathology testing. However while not strictly necessary because the symptoms are most likely caused by a urinary tract 
infection (UTI) easily treated with antibiotics, the history would make it clinically relevant to also order a kidney scan as these 
symptoms are also consistent with a more serious kidney infection. It would not be clinically relevant to order a brain scan. 
However, the decision of whether or not to order the kidney scan and its relevance may ultimately depend on hindsight, because 
if the correct diagnosis was a simple UTI then arguably a scan was irrelevant and unnecessary. However, if the patient was admitted 
to hospital that night with a serious kidney infection and a kidney scan had not been undertaken, the medical practitioner may be 
negligent. 
64 In Australia, a patient who presents to a medical practitioner with a sprained ankle, could have an ECG and an asthma 
management plan billed, neither of which may be clinically relevant or necessary. In the United States, for example, the medical 
billing process commences with the allocation of an internationally recognised disease code prior to allocating billing codes. This 
enables the collection of data to determine clinical relevance but also acts as a barrier to the billing of codes which do not match 
an appropriate disease code. So in the above example, a sprained ankle presentation may be blocked from billing an ECG and 
asthma plan. 
65 In Sood v The Queen (2006) 201 FLR 119; [2006] NSWCCA 114, Dr Sood charged separate fees for counselling patients and 
for operating theatre costs, at the same time as billing directly to Medicare. The Court found that the separate charges were illegal 
on the basis that counselling and operating theatre fees were included in the scope of the services Dr Sood had billed to Medicare. 
Dr Sood was found to have effectively double dipped, which was a crime. 
66 The Department of Health, The Relative Value Study <http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/health-
rvs-overview.htm>. 
67 Sood v The Queen (2006) 201 FLR 119; [2006] NSWCCA 114. Dr Sood adopted a pattern of practice whereby she routinely 
bulk billed and charged a gap at the same time. While she held that she was charging the gap for a separate service, the prosecution 
successfully argued the gap was part of the service that she bulk billed, which was a criminal offence. 
68 The appeal was ultimately allowed on the basis of misdirection of the jury by the court of first instance, but there was no 
consensus on this particular issue. 
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the parameters of the professional service provided.69 This would therefore preclude Dr Sood from 
charging additional fees. 
In the jury trial, counsel for Dr Sood argued that the additional fees Dr Sood charged (which she had 
described on the relevant invoices as “counselling and theatre fees”), were not fees in respect of the 
procedure she performed, but were instead fees in respect of separate professional services for which 
she was entitled to charge a fee. Dr Sood contended that there were up to four distinct services which 
might be provided to patients who attended her clinic each day: a consultation, counselling, theatre fees 
and a procedure. Having read the Medicare Benefits Schedule or MBS (discussed below), Dr Sood 
argued that she believed she was entitled to apply mixed billing arrangements across the four 
components, sometimes exercising her constitutional right to charge as she chose, and other times 
relinquishing it. This approach was (and remains) consistent with advice available for medical 
practitioners on Medicare’s website.70 
Section 20A of the HIA uses the singular “service” as opposed to the plural “services” in recognition of 
each Medicare service being unique and finite. Implicit in this construct is the ability for practitioners 
who provide more than one professional service to the same patient on the same day, to bill for those 
services using mixed billing arrangements, subject to certain exceptions.71 
In Sood only one of the services the practitioner provided to each patient was subject to an exception 
and therefore it appeared open to her to direct bill the procedure, charge a private fee for the counselling 
and theatre fees and direct bill the consultation, as long as she accepted the government rebate “in full 
payment” for the relevant direct billed services. However, the Crown contended that the manual billing 
method used by Dr Sood included a declaration that no payments had been sought in respect of the 
professional services she had direct billed. By charging additional counselling and theatre fees, the 
Crown successfully argued that Dr Sood had sought unlawful additional payments in respect of the direct 
billed procedure. This was enough for a jury to return a guilty verdict to 96 counts of dishonestly 
obtaining a financial benefit by deception contrary to s 134.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
The Sood decision highlights the complexities in what is widely considered a simple direct bill 
transaction, which most Australians know and refer to as “bulk billing”. Numerous aspects of the 
decisions both at first instance and on appeal are troubling. 
At the time of the jury trial, the costs of running operating theatres, which Dr Sood described as “theatre 
fees” had already been separated from medical practitioner fees in Australia for a decade.72 Therefore if 
Dr Sood had provided the same service in a private hospital rather than in a private clinic, there would 
have been no ability for the prosecution to mount its argument on this point because operating theatre 
fees were always billed separately by the facility.73 Furthermore, the language of the service description 
which Dr Sood was found to have breached, made (and still makes) no mention of operating theatre 
costs as forming a component of the total rebate of $144.35.74 The service description was this short 
phrase: “Evacuation of the contents of the gravid uterus by curettage or suction curettage.” The authors 
                                                          
69 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 20A 
70 Australian Government Department of Human Services, Bulk bill payments to health professionals: Bulk billing and private 
billing together (Department of Human Services, 2019) <https://www.humanservices.gov.au/organisations/health-
professionals/subjects/bulk-bill-payments-health-professionals#a4>. 
71 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 15. 
72 L McDonald, ‘Healthcare Funding from a Private Hospital Perspective’ (2012) 2(2) HIM-INTERCHANGE 8 
<http://www.himaa2.org.au/HIM-I/sites/default/files/HIM-I%202-2%20Report%20McDonald.pdf>. 
73 Accommodation and operating theatre fees are separately invoiced by Australian hospitals for payment either under activity-
based funding arrangements or by Private Health Insurers. Medical practitioners are entitled to the medical services described only 
in the MBS. 
74 The relevant description of the procedure which Dr Sood billed was “Item 35643 Evacuation of the contents of the gravid uterus 
by curettage or suction curettage not being a service to which Items 35639 or 35640 applies, including procedures to which Items 
35626, 35627 or 35630 applies, where performed (Anaes. 17705=3B+2T)”. 
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suggest that both the court of first instance and appeal adopted an unsatisfactorily broad interpretation 
of this service and went so far as to suggest that counselling also formed part of the surgical procedure. 
This was even though it was accepted that some patients did not go ahead with the procedure after having 
had and paid for a separate counselling service.75 
Dr Sood repeatedly stated during the jury trial that she did not know the conduct for which she stood 
accused was wrong. A recent study suggests there may have been some veracity to this stance because 
recent evidence suggests medical practitioners do not have the high levels of legal literacy expected of 
them in relation to Medicare billing.76 
This notwithstanding, the Commonwealth was successful in prosecuting Dr Sood and has since 
leveraged from this and similar decisions77 by publishing a non-exhaustive list of what it considers to be 
included in the scope of a professional service. However, the Sood decision may in fact have weakened 
the government’s ability to manage compliance by shrouding every MBS item number in an infinite 
array of possible inclusions which will only be known to medical practitioners who find themselves 
before a court.78 
The appeal judgment of Adams J, who dissented strongly on this point, commented that there appeared 
to be no satisfactory interpretation of the scheme available and expressed his view on the issue of 
professional service parameters in the following terms: 
the Chief Justice is right to draw attention to the ubiquity in the Act of the phrase “in respect of a 
professional service”. However, in each case the phrase could have substituted for it the word “for” 
without any loss of syntactical correctness. Is there a loss of referential meaning? The answer would be 
“yes” only if the underlying assumption is that more was intended to be covered than would be covered 
by the word “for”. Aside from the phrase itself, the Act does not, in my respectful view, suggest the need 
for wider reference. The difficulty in accepting that the phrase itself is intended to reflect a wider reference 
is that it entails considerable uncertainty in a context where precision of scope is of considerable 
importance. …The striking characteristic of the Table … is the clinical and minute precision in which 
each service … is described. … Although the Regulations comprise a distinct statutory instrument, it 
forms part of a detailed, comprehensive scheme … the acceptance of the Crown submission would, in 
effect, surround each item with a penumbra of indeterminate meaning inconsistent with the structure of 
the legislative scheme and unfair to the medical practitioners attempting to work within its boundaries. … 
I do not accept that the legislature intended to place doctors in the position where a not unreasonable 
interpretation of the Act leads them to make a claim which ex post facto a judge (or, for that matter, a 
jury) will find to be wrong and render them liable to criminal prosecution. … The question of 
interpretation is debatable and the fact that a doctor makes a claim, even if he or she thinks it might not 
be justifiable … should not render him or her liable to prosecution.79 
It is noteworthy that while the majority of items and services listed in the Medicare scheme relate to 
specialist services, most discussion around fraudulent and non-compliant billing, as well as the majority 
of prosecutions, have focused on general practitioners, such as Dr Sood. 
The Medicare Benefits Schedule 
To assist in understanding appropriate billing practices for professional services, Australian medical 
practitioners are referred to a resource known as the MBS, which utilises a schedule of fees originally 
                                                          
75 Sood v The Queen (2006) 201 FLR 119; [2006] NSWCCA 114. 
76 Faux et al, n 32. 
77 Dalima Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (Unreported, NSWSL, No 25304/87, 22 October 1987). 
78 Faux et al, n 32. 
79 Sood v The Queen (2006) 201 FLR 119, [149]–[152]; [2006] NSWCCA 114. 
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developed in consultation with the Australian Medical Association (AMA) on a recommendation made 
in the Nimmo report.80 
The MBS can best be described as a departmental compilation of the HIA, Regulations81 and Tables.82 
However, it is not an instrument of Parliament and therefore does not have the force of law. Accordingly, 
interpretation of item descriptions, explanatory notes and commentary throughout the MBS is not correct 
statements of the law but rather interpretations as to how the government views the law, which are open 
to legal challenge. In the case of Sood just discussed, Dr Sood gave evidence that she had read the 
relevant sections of the MBS but its contents were insufficient to enable her to predict how three judges 
would later view the corresponding section of the legislation. 
Indeed, it is common for interpretative statements contained in the MBS book to be inconsistent with 
the law beneath, with itself via the online version of the MBS, with the department’s own online billing 
portal ECLIPSE (which every medical practice in the country is required to use) and with the linked 
funding systems that administer Australian hospital payment arrangements. Examples are described in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 
Brief 
Description of 
Issue 
Details of the Discrepancy Impact on Medical 
Practitioner (MP) 
MBS book 
inconsistent 
with MBS 
online version 
The MBS book states in TN.8.2 that the multiple operation rule 
applies to all items in T8 group, except items from subgroup 12. 
This would include item 44359. However, the MBS online 
version at http://www.mbsonline.gov.au version contradicts the 
MBS book by stating that the multiple operation rule applies to 
item 44359, which is confirmed as being part of T8 and 
subgroup 12. Section 15(4) of the HIA confirms the position 
taken in the MBS book but not the online version, the latter of 
which appears to be legally incorrect. 
Reliance on MBS 
online will lead to 
underbilling for item 
44359, if billing with 
other surgical services 
(which is usual). If 
Medicare applies the 
law correctly it will pay 
higher than the amount 
billed. This may put the 
MP in the position of 
believing an 
overpayment has 
occurred and the MP 
may be accused of 
rorting by not actioning 
a refund. Conversely, if 
Medicare applies the 
MBS online version, the 
MP may be accused of 
overcharging. 
MBS online 
version is 
inconsistent 
with itself 
The description of item 24 on MBS online 
http://www.mbsonline.gov.au implies the same fees are payable 
for each patient seen by a GP doing a ward round in a hospital, 
but in fact, when one clicks through to the ready reckoner it is 
MP may be accused of 
overcharging and 
rorting when the MP 
was in fact making a 
                                                          
80 Australia, Commonwealth Committee of Enquiry into Health Insurance, JA Nimmo, n 1. Following the Nimmo Report, the 
federal assembly of the AMA passed a resolution in 1969 supporting the development of a list of the “most common fees” to guide 
the determination of medical benefits and the subsequent list became the basis of the first MBS in 1975, which has continued to 
evolve for 40 years. 
81 Health Insurance Regulations 2018 (Cth). 
82 Health Insurance (General Medical Services Table) Regulations 2018 (Cth); Health Insurance (Pathology Services Table) 
Regulations 2018 (Cth); Health Insurance (Diagnostic Imaging Services Table) Regulations 2018 (Cth). 
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apparent this is incorrect and a sliding scale applies, meaning 
the MP should not charge the same fee for each patient. Both 
sections of MBS online refer to the fee being the fee for item 23 
plus another amount. However, this is potentially misleading 
because item 23 is paid at 100% of the Medicare Schedule Fee, 
whereas item 24 is paid at the lower inpatient rate of 75%. 
legitimate attempt to 
apply the convoluted 
and incomprehensible 
description provided on 
MBS online relating to 
legitimate services 
properly provided by 
the MP. The MP may 
be accused of 
attempting to rort the 
system if the claim 
finally submitted is 
incorrect. 
Advice and 
information 
from 
government is 
inconsistent 
with the law 
and cannot be 
practically 
applied by MPs 
due to 
shortcomings 
of ECLIPSE 
online claiming 
platform 
The MBS book states that an MP can either provide their 
provider number on each claim, or their name and the address 
where they provided the service. However, Medicare’s online 
help page at this link 
https://www.humanservices.gov.au/organisations/health-
professionals/services/medicare/hpos/resources/managing-
provider-numbers implies this is not the case. It states MPs must 
have a provider number for each location where they work. 
However, in circumstances where Medicare refuses to issue an 
MP with a provider number the law provides than an MP can 
still claim by instead using their name and the address where the 
service was provided. This is provided in Div 5 of the Health 
Insurance Regulations Reg 51(2)(a) which provides that MPs 
can satisfy “prescribed particular” requirements by including 
their name and the address of the place where the service was 
provided, in lieu of a provider number. 
However, irrespective 
of the legal requirement 
clearly articulated in 
Reg 51(2)(a), the 
government’s online 
ECLIPSE platform 
which all MPs are 
required to use to 
submit electronic 
claims, does not include 
a data field for an 
address. Therefore, 
even if an MP wanted to 
submit a compliant 
electronic claim to 
Medicare using their 
name and the address 
where they provided the 
service, they are 
physically prevented 
from doing so. This 
may place an MP in the 
position of being unable 
to comply with legal 
requirements, for which 
the MP may be 
investigated and 
accused of deliberately 
attempting to rort the 
system. 
MBS billing 
codes are 
inconsistent 
with the 
procedure 
codes used to 
reimburse 
Australian 
hospitals 
The procedure codes used to reimburse Australian hospitals are 
known as ACHIs, or the Australian Classification of Health 
Interventions. ACHIs were originally derived from the MBS. 
There are now 6224 ACHIs which map to only 1363 MBS 
codes, meaning the MBS and ACHIs are no longer directly 
aligned or consistent, which can cause downstream problems for 
MPs. For example, an MP ophthalmologist performs a cataract 
operation and claims item 42702 which covers both the lens 
extraction and the insertion of the new intraocular lens. The 
The MP is forced to 
change and bill two 
item numbers instead of 
one, costing Australian 
tax payers significantly 
more. The MP may be 
accused of rorting as a 
result of billing two 
services when one 
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claim is rejected because it is inconsistent with the claim 
submitted by the hospital. The hospital biller has changed the 
MPs item numbers from 42702 to 42701 (insertion of new lens) 
and 42698 (extraction of old lens) because item 42702 was 
removed from the ACHIs but not from the MBS. The hospital 
biller is therefore forced to change the MPs item numbers to 
generate the required bill from the hospital. 
service, item 42702, 
was clearly appropriate 
in the circumstances. 
The MP has effectively 
been placed in a 
position of having no 
option other than to 
double code, because 
until she does, neither 
her claim nor the 
hospital’s will be paid. 
Despite the MP being 
legally responsible for 
the MBS services 
claimed, a third party 
far downstream from 
the MP has changed the 
MPs item numbers 
without the MPs 
knowledge or consent, 
unknowingly potentially 
exposing the MP to 
criminal liability. 
DAILY MEDICARE BILLING FROM THE MEDICAL PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVE 
Medical practitioners have no option but to engage with the Medicare scheme and comply with its 
requirements despite the fact that there is limited guidance as to how the scheme works, and how to bill 
correctly.83 So convoluted has the scheme now become, that even threshold decisions create avenues for 
unintentional non-compliant billing to occur. 
Provider Numbers and the Impact of Electronic Billing on Compliance 
Medical practitioners are required to bill using personal identifiers called “provider numbers”, which are 
central to the integrity of the Medicare scheme. Collection of provider number data ensures the Health 
Department is able to track the identity of providers of professional services, analyse service delivery 
patterns and monitor compliance.84 However, the law pertaining to provider numbers, though recently 
revised, has failed to accommodate the realities of electronic billing – now the main form of bill 
submission – which was introduced in 2002. 
Section 19(6) of the HIA requires prescribed particulars to be included on accounts and the newly revised 
2018 Regulations describe those particulars as including the practitioner’s name and practice address, or 
the practitioner’s provider number.85 In similar fashion to the definitions already described, the wording 
of the provider number definition adds further ambiguity to claiming hurdles which medical practitioners 
must navigate. The regulations state that a provider number “identifies the person and a place where the 
                                                          
83 Faux et al, n 32. 
84 Department of Human Services, About Medicare Provider Numbers <https://www.humanservices.gov.au/organisations/health-
professionals/services/medicare/medicare-benefits-health-professionals/apply-medicare-provider-number/about-medicare-
provider-numbers>. 
85 Health Insurance Regulations 2018 (Cth), reg 51. 
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person practices the person’s profession”,86 it does not state that a provider number identifies the person 
and the place where the service was provided, though this is the advise Medicare provides to medical 
practitioners, despite it often not being possible.87 
The government facilitates electronic billing through its portal known as ECLIPSE,88 which all medical 
practitioners are required to use. However, many of the shortcomings of this portal exacerbate billing 
challenges for medical practitioners. ECLIPSE only facilitates a provider number being linked to one 
software system and one bank account at a time despite this being misaligned with modern medical 
billing, where medical practitioners may be forced to bill from multiple different software systems at a 
single street address.89 Currently, the only way to manage this scenario is to bill using multiple provider 
numbers for services provided at one address, which, applying Medicare’s interpretation of the 
Regulations, would potentially represent a breach of the scheme’s requirements. However, any judicial 
determination would likely be focussed on whether the information provided to Medicare was false in a 
material particular 90. The authors suggest this would be difficult to prove if a bill were otherwise 
correct.91 
This notwithstanding, with no decided cases to assist, interpretations of the relevant regulations are 
speculative, including those of the government, which has itself acted inconsistently on this issue by 
sometimes arbitrarily allowing some medical practitioners to have two provider numbers at the same 
address and others not, and allowing the use of an existing provider number at an unrelated location on 
a temporary basis.92 
The underlying provider number problem is that in the 40 years since the scheme began, a service 
location can now realistically be in a car with a laptop or mobile phone.93 However, the system remains 
designed for an era in which electronic services were not available. Failure to adapt the system to modern 
medical practice may therefore be encouraging unavoidable non-compliance by medical practitioners, 
but may have also rendered the Government unable to take any action when legitimate concerns about 
incorrect use of provider numbers do arise. 
CONTRACTING OUT OF THE CIVIL CONSCRIPTION CAVEAT 
                                                          
86 Health Insurance Regulations 2018 (Cth), reg 4. 
87 Department of Human Services, eLearning Modules, What Is a Provider Number? Slide 8 of 19 
<http://medicareaust.com/MODULES/MBS/MBSM11/index.html>. 
88 Department of Human Services, Simplified Billing and ECLIPSE <https://www.humanservices.gov.au/organisations/health-
professionals/services/medicare/simplified-billing-and-eclipse>. 
89 A common example occurs when a medical practitioner has one provider number linked to Hospital A’s address, but the hospital 
has co-located public and private hospitals and specialist consulting suites, all of which share the same street address. The medical 
practitioner can only have one provider number at that street address according to Medicare’s current approach. However, the 
specialist suites may require that the medical practitioner bills through their software, the public hospital through theirs and the 
private hospital through a third software suite, with the revenue generated being legitimately directed into different bank accounts 
based on contractual arrangements. If Medicare refuses to issue additional provider numbers for the medical practitioner at the 
one street address, the only option is for the medical practitioner to use a different provider number for each of the three medical 
billing software suites. 
90 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 128A. 
91 If the only incorrect detail was the provider number suffix of 2 digits, but otherwise the claim was correct in every particular 
and the right amount of money was paid correctly for services correctly rendered and the medical practitioner provided additional 
details on the claim of the service location (which is mandatory data on all modern medical billing software) the authors suggest 
it would be extremely difficult to mount a compelling prosecution case. 
92 Department of Human Services, eLearning Modules, n 87, Slide 13 of 19. 
93 Telehealth services for medical specialists are included in the Medicare scheme and all that is required is an internet connection 
and video capability such as Skype. Therefore it is not fanciful for a medical specialist to pull over to the side of the road, power 
up a laptop (or even just use a mobile phone) and conduct a scheduled, Medicare claimable, online telehealth attendance from a 
car. 
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There are many instances in daily practice where medical practitioners may have unknowingly 
contracted out of their constitutional freedom to set their fees. A common example is the Veterans’ 
Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) (VEA) which is one of a suite of laws regulating entitlements for ex-
servicemen and women, and current military personnel and their dependants.94 
The Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) has a hybrid role as a publicly funded organisation with 
diverse portfolios. The VEA deals with what is described as “medical and other treatment”95 (as opposed 
to “professional services”) with s 90 enabling the preparation of written “Treatment Principles” designed 
to be legally binding on medical practitioners and articulated in a document called “LMO Notes”.96 
The VEA cross-references the HIA in determining private patient principles97 and reflects the 
constitutional freedom of DVA-eligible patients to enter private arrangements if they wish. DVA has 
adopted the MBS for its subsidised medical services (though with different fees) and applies Medicare 
rules.98 Since 1985 all DVA claims have been administered by Medicare.99 However, the High Court 
has confirmed that the two schemes are completely separate, French CJ confirming that a medical 
practitioner unable to participate in the Medicare scheme could continue to provide services to entitled 
veterans.100 Indeed one particular sub-class of entitled veterans who hold injury-specific “white cards” 
may have no alternative other than to claim through both DVA and Medicare, though separately, in 
relation to the same visit to a medical practitioner.101 
Information provided to eligible veterans via its website uses language suggestive of a prohibition 
against charges being levied by medical practitioners in any circumstances such as: 
If you are billed by your LMO / GP or medical specialist, do not pay the account and advise DVA 
immediately.102 
Statements such as this suggest that, in similar fashion to Medicare, medical practitioners are assumed 
to have knowledge of DVA requirements. However, available evidence suggests this is not the case.103 
When medical practitioners register their provider numbers for electronic claims, they are automatically 
enrolled in the DVA scheme.104 The enrolment process occurs without any active involvement on the 
part of the medical practitioner, effectively conscripting them into the DVA scheme without their 
knowledge or consent. Enrolling providers in this way under a false premise of consent may give rise to 
unintentional non-compliance and create tensions in managing the expectations of patients who have 
been led to believe all medical services under their DVA entitlements will not incur additional fees. It 
may also render vulnerable the integrity of the DVA scheme and the ability of the government to 
                                                          
94 Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth); Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth); Military Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 2004 (Cth). 
95 Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) Pt V. 
96 Australian Government, Department of Veteran’s Affairs, Providers/Doctors, LMO Notes 
<https://www.dva.gov.au/providers/doctors#lmonotes>. 
97 Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) s 90A. 
98 Australian Government, Department of Veteran’s Affairs, Providers/Doctors, Notes for Claiming DVA Fees 
<http://www.dva.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/providers/fee_schedules.pdf>. 
99 Scotton and Macdonald, n 33. 
100 Wong v Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573; [2009] HCA 3. 
101 For example, a white card holder sees GP for leg injury (which is covered under the white card) as well as the flu, which is not. 
The claim for the leg must be made under the DVA white card but the claim for the flu cannot be because the flu is not covered 
under the card. The item 23 for the flu would have to be claimed under Medicare. 
102 Australian Government, Department of Veteran’s Affairs, Fact Sheets for Eligible Veterans 
<https://www.dva.gov.au/factsheet-hsv80-local-medical-officer-and-medical-specialist-services>. 
103 Faux et al, n 32. 
104 Australian Government, Department of Veteran’s Affairs, Providers, Becoming a DVA Service Provider 
<https://www.dva.gov.au/providers/becoming-dva-service-provider>. 
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prosecute errant medical practitioners who were never afforded an opportunity to know in advance the 
terms and conditions of the DVA scheme prior to being involuntarily and unknowingly enrolled in it. 
Similarly, workers’ compensation and third-party claims can present challenges for medical practitioners 
who may hold an erroneous belief they are not permitted to raise fees against compensable patients 
beyond the gazetted rates referred to within the various State and Territory schemes. All such schemes 
derive the majority of services and fees from the MBS, with some additional services being found in the 
Australian Medical Association (AMA) schedule of fees.105 Billing under these arrangements 
incorporates hybrid Medicare and AMA rules and fees, adding another layer of complexity for medical 
practitioners who may unknowingly levy incorrect charges in these circumstances. While medical 
practitioners are expected to know and understand the requirements of each of these schemes, they have 
no training or skills which would enable them to make a decision about whether they are legally 
permitted to charge a workers’ compensation patient or not. State workers’ compensation legislation 
does not prevail over constitutional provisions and as such, medical practitioners retain an overarching 
right to charge as they wish. State workers’ compensation provisions will typically limit insurer 
liability,106 but this does not have an impact upon a medical practitioner’s right to charge a compensable 
patient as he or she chooses, although it is unlikely a medical practitioner would know this. 
MEDICARE BILLING FOR HOSPITAL SERVICES 
In addition to the basic billing framework presented thus far (that medical practitioners either exercise 
their constitutional right to set fees as they please, or bill in accordance with other contractual 
arrangements), when a patient is admitted to an Australian hospital, multiple additional legal layers come 
into play, with overlapping and sometimes contradictory requirements depending on whether the patient 
is in a public or private facility. 
Options for billing private inpatients under Medicare were expanded in 1998107 and again in 2000,108 
when changes to the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) and the HIA introduced the ability for patients to 
assign Medicare benefits to private health insurers (PHIs), the central objective being to simplify billing 
processes and limit out-of-pocket costs for hospitalised patients.109 On the back of a failed attempt by 
the government to encourage medical practitioners to contract out of their constitutional freedom and 
fix fee arrangements for in hospital billing,110 the Health Legislation Amendment (Gap Cover Schemes) 
Bill 2000 (Cth) was introduced into Parliament with the objective of controlling medical fees without 
contracted arrangements.111 
While referred to as “simplified” billing arrangements, a new medical billing industry quickly emerged 
to deal with the complexities of the new schemes, under which medical bills involved up to five parties, 
                                                          
105 AMA has maintained its separate schedule of medical fees, which is available only to AMA members or upon payment of a 
fee <https://ama.com.au/resources/fees-list>. 
106 Workers Compensation Act 1987 No 70 (NSW) Pt 3 Div 3 s 61. 
107 D Mendelson, “Devaluation of a Constitutional Guarantee: The History of Section 51 (xxiiiA) of the Commonwealth 
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<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/Bd9900/2000bd134?print=1>. 
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111 Then Federal Health Minister Michael Wooldridge said: “This Bill amends the National Health Act 1953 (NHA) and the Health 
Insurance Act 1973 (HIA) to provide for gap cover schemes. The purpose of these schemes is to enable registered health benefits 
organisations to provide no gap and/or known gap private health insurance without the need for contracts.” 
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with various contracts and legal relationships that collectively determined the fate of the Medicare rebate 
at the heart of the transaction.112 These schemes, often referred to as “gapcover schemes” remain in 
common use today. Practically, patients will typically have no involvement in a gapcover transaction 
though the legal basis for this is somewhat labyrinthine and porous. 
Under these schemes, s 20A(2A) of the HIA provides that an eligible person may enter into an agreement 
to assign his or her right to the Medicare benefit to a PHI, an approved billing agent or another person.113 
Such assignment is subject to s 20B, which provides that no signature is required in these 
circumstances.114 The net effect being that a patient may unknowingly enter into an agreement with a 
PHI allowing the PHI to receive their Medicare benefit but without signing any agreement to that effect. 
Where the agreement between the patient and the PHI exists is somewhat a mystery. Available policy 
documents of some PHIs are silent on the issue but nowhere does there appear to be a specific legal basis 
facilitating ongoing agreement for all inpatient Medicare benefit entitlements to be automatically 
assigned to the patient’s PHI. This would seem to be quite an important omission. 
Further, the wording of s 20A(2A) refers to a singular “benefit” which is consistent with the overarching 
provisions of the HIA already discussed. But a question then arises concerning when a patient is admitted 
to hospital and enters an unsigned agreement with a PHI to assign relevant Medicare benefits, does the 
PHI have a right to obtain all eligible Medicare benefits under some opaque grouping arrangements or 
is the PHI subject to the same onerous provisions as medical practitioners who receive assigned 
Medicare benefits? It would appear the same requirements which may expose a medical practitioner to 
a risk of criminal liability for each individual professional service claimed do not apply to PHIs, because 
while medical practitioners are required to obtain the patient’s consent every time they provide a service, 
it appears the PHIs have effectively been given an open and ongoing consent to collect public money, 
via the patient’s Medicare benefit for every inpatient service. 
Of further concern is the question of how long the PHI has to transfer Medicare benefits it receives from 
the government to the medical practitioner. In 1999 s 73AAG(n) and (o) of the National Health Act 1953 
(Cth) provided that Medicare benefits must be passed to the medical practitioner within two months.115 
Further legislative tightening of this provision occurred in 2002.116 However, in 2007 the gapcover 
schemes were completely subsumed into the HIA and the Private Health Insurance Act 2007 (Cth) and 
provisions relating to a specific timeframe in which the transfer of public money from the health fund to 
the medical practitioner must take place were removed for PHIs but retained and moved into a new Deed 
Agreement for approved Billing Agents, who now have 90 days to pass benefits to a medical 
practitioner.117 
Following the Peverill decision of the High Court, once a Medicare claim has been received and 
approved it becomes immediately payable. However, the original intention was that the immediate 
payment would be made to a provider of professional services (usually a medical practitioner) not a PHI. 
Billing agents are a further intermediary between the PHI and the medical practitioner who typically 
                                                          
112 Including – a medical practitioner, a patient, the government, the private health insurer and possibly a billing agent. 
113 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth), s 20A. 
114 This is because the assignment of benefit takes place under Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 20A(2A) not subs (1), the latter 
clause requiring the patient’s signature 
115 Private health insurance circulars 1999, HBF 575 PH 336 
<http://webarchive.nla.gov.au/gov/20100307212147/http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/health-
privatehealth-providers-circulars99-00-575_336.htm>. 
116 By the introduction of the Health Legislation Amendment (Private Health Industry Measures) Act 2002 (Cth). The explanatory 
memorandum to the Bill stated: “Item 3 amends paragraph (o) of Schedule 1 [of the National Health Act 1953] to insert a reference 
to sub-section 20A(2AA) of the HIA. This amendment requires health funds to provide the Health Insurance Commission (HIC) 
with access to documents relating to Medicare benefits paid under a gap cover scheme, when requested to do so by the HIC. This 
will enable the HIC to access all necessary documents to audit the payment of Medicare benefits and ensure that public money 
has been properly directed.” 
117 Deed Agreement between the Federal Government and a Billing Agent, Clause 9 – Payment to an Assigning Practitioner – 90-
Day Period <https://www.humanservices.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/deed-poll.pdf>. 
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manage the billing process for medical practitioners for whom the task is too onerous and complex. 
Billing agents are often hospitals or medical billing companies who operate trust accounts into which 
medical billing revenue received from PHIs is paid before being distributed to medical practitioners. 
This convoluted passage of public money in the form of Medicare benefits processed under gapcover 
arrangements is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Patient -> Medicare -> PHI ->      Billing -
>Agent 
Medical 
Practitioner 
Privately insured 
patient 
unknowingly 
agrees to assign 
all relevant 
Medicare 
benefits (MB) 
while in hospital 
to a PHI. 
Applying the High 
Court decision in 
Peverill, Medicare 
must immediately 
release payment of the 
MB upon receipt and 
acceptance of claims. 
Accordingly, 
Medicare transfers 
75% of the Medicare 
Schedule Fee to the 
patient’s PHI straight 
away. 
PHI receives 75% of 
the Medicare 
Schedule Fee for 
each claim and can 
retain it indefinitely. 
There is no 
mechanism or 
practical oversite of 
the PHIs handling of 
this payment of 
public money, 
particularly oversight 
of necessary refunds. 
Pursuant to the 
terms of the 
Deed, a billing 
agent must pass 
the MB, plus any 
additional PHI 
component, to the 
medical 
practitioner 
within 90 days of 
receipt from the 
PHI. 
The medical 
practitioner has no 
practical control or 
visibility over this 
entire process and 
can be prosecuted 
by Medicare 
and/or the PHI 
acting separately 
or together. 
By adding additional parties to the transaction, specifically PHIs (who receive 75% of the Medicare 
schedule fee for each inpatient professional service billed), without sufficient regulatory safeguards, the 
government may have exposed public money to the risk of misappropriation. The most common 
practical example occurs when PHIs use delaying tactics such as making payment to the medical 
practitioner contingent upon the happening of another event over which the medical practitioner has no 
control, such as proof of a corresponding hospital bill for the same service. While relevant contracts 
between the PHIs, medical practitioners and hospitals may lawfully enable delayed transfer of the PHI 
component of each payment, the Medicare component should either be immediately released to the 
medical practitioner or returned to consolidated revenue, which would better serve the national interest. 
Unfortunately, lax regulation has meant that once the Medicare payment is in the hands of the PHI the 
government has little practical control over it. 
The recent introduction of the Federal Government’s new Gold, Silver and Bronze PHI products118 may 
exacerbate gapcover billing challenges because until now, if Medicare approved a claim the PHI was 
required to also approve and pay it.119 However, under the new products this will no longer be the case. 
All Australians will continue to be eligible for all services under Medicare but no longer under their PHI 
policies and it is unclear what will happen to Medicare benefits paid to PHIs in circumstances where a 
patient’s PHI policy does not cover a service which Medicare has approved and paid to the PHI. The 
critical mechanism to return the Medicare benefit to consolidated revenue is unclear. 
If a patient disputes a gapcover bill they may direct concerns to all or any of the medical practitioner, 
the PHI and Medicare, whereas the medical practitioner cannot. The medical practitioner is only able to 
seek information in relation to a gapcover bill from the PHI, but can be investigated by both Medicare 
and the PHI, acting separately or together, in relation to a suspect bill.120 Furthermore, an unintended 
                                                          
118 Private Health Insurance Reforms: Gold/Silver/Bronze/Basic Product Tiers 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/private-health-insurance-reforms-fact-sheet-gold-gilver-bronze-
basic-product-categories>. 
119 Private Health Insurance (Complying Product) Rules 2015 (Cth). 
120 Additionally, medical practitioners can be investigated by the Health Care Complaints Commission and/or the Medical Board 
of Australia if the patient complains. 
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consequence of these arrangements is that while bulk billing and charging a gap is a criminal offence as 
in the case of Sood,121 once the same Medicare rebate is passed to a PHI under gapcover arrangements, 
what was once a criminal offence is effectively reduced to a lesser civil offence where a medical 
practitioner who generates a gapcover bill but also charges an unauthorised gap may have simply 
breached a contract term with the PHI. 
Gapcover billing has become so complex that even PHIs themselves have been unable to understand it. 
In 2011 Medibank Private (MBP) (then a government owned PHI) was the last of the major PHIs to 
commence online gapcover billing. Gapcover legislation provided that patients were to be given written 
informed financial consent detailing any likely gap payments before they went to hospital.122 This 
provision was inserted to accommodate the hybrid “known gap” schemes where the patient would assign 
their Medicare benefit to the PHI and also pay another amount to the provider called a “known gap”. 
When MBP commenced online billing, it failed to understand that no gap billing did not, by definition, 
involve gaps, and proceeded to create a requirement that all no gap bills submitted via its new online 
billing channel include a declaration that written informed financial consent had been obtained. This 
caused thousands of correct gapcover bills to be wrongly identified as being incorrect and placed 
clinicians in the invidious position of having to give a false declaration if they were to have any hope of 
being correctly paid for legitimate services correctly billed. Some months later MBP conceded its 
mistake, advising providers that after seeking internal clarity the issue had been rectified and the written 
consent requirement withdrawn.123 It is once again apparent that for the medical practitioners who have 
to navigate the requirements of these complex schemes there is little support afforded them should they 
experience confusion and unintentionally err in relation to a bill they submit for payment. 
In another recent example MBP appeared to again be unclear about its own complex known gap scheme 
when it was quoted in the media expressing concern about policy-holders being charged $500 gaps 
which were administered by medical practitioners using split bills,124 when this was in fact correct and 
compliant administration of the very rules MBP had put in place.125 Inaccurate reporting such as this has 
unfortunately become widespread and is a symptom of a bigger problem where the public (including the 
media) have become so confused about what is and is not compliant medical billing they are prone to 
believing falsehoods which are difficult for medical practitioners to rebut, particularly when the medical 
practitioners themselves may be unsure about whether they are billing correctly. 
Perhaps the most concerning quite recent addition to the Gordian Knot that has become gapcover 
regulation is that the terms and conditions of some PHI gapcover schemes126 have the effect of making 
medical practitioner participation in their schemes contingent upon agreement to terms which may place 
the medical practitioner in breach of the Medicare scheme, in circumstances where the PHIs have 
questionable jurisdiction to purport to exercise such control. This is explained and presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 
                                                          
121 Sood v The Queen (2006) 201 FLR 119; [2006] NSWCCA 114. 
122 Health Legislation Amendment (Gap Cover Schemes) Act 2000 (Cth), s 73BDD(7). 
123 Medibank Private, Informed Financial Consent and Eclipse Claims <http://www.medibank.com.au/Health-
Covers/Information-For-Health-Care-Providers/GapCover-Information/Article.aspx?Id=131>. 
124 Patients being bled by specialists as out-of-pocket costs https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/health/patients-being-bled-
by-specialists-as-outofpocket-costs-surge/news-story/04720fe356186190de873461449aead2 
125 Medibank Private GapCover Provider Guide <https://www.medibank.com.au/content/dam/retail/providers/gap-
cover/GapCover-booklet-2018.pdf>. 
126 Bupa Medical Gap Scheme Terms and Conditions August 2018 
<https://www.bupa.com.au/staticfiles/BupaP3/For%20Providers%20Home/MediaFiles/PDF/bup16245-medical-gap-scheme-
terms-and-conditions.pdf>; Terms and Conditions of Using the Medibank GapCover Scheme 
<https://www.medibank.com.au/content/dam/retail/providers/gap-cover/Revised_Terms_and_Conditions.pdf>; NIB Medigap 
Terms and Conditions <https://www.nib.com.au/docs/medigap-terms-and-conditions>. 
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MEDICARE BILLING IN PUBLIC HOSPITALS 
Gapcover schemes are used in both private and public hospitals. In the latter, complex funding 
arrangements between State and federal governments enable State-run public hospitals to use the 
additional revenue to supplement annual grant funding. The practical application of these arrangements 
is to require publicly practising, salaried medical officers, to bill patients who elect to be treated 
privately. However, some PHIs pay a lesser amount than if the same services were provided in a private 
hospital, although the legal basis for this is somewhat opaque given the PHIs are required to pay under 
their Gapcover schemes at the rates approved by the Minister.127 
Publicly practising medical practitioners are required to bill under their individual Right of Private 
Practice Agreements (RoPP) for patients who elect to be treated privately. Under these arrangements the 
hospital will usually retain some or all of the revenue collected. The arrangements are different in every 
State and Territory as are the arrangements for Visiting Medical Officers (VMO), who may also use 
gapcover schemes for private patients in public hospitals, though all PHIs will reimburse VMOs at the 
gapcover rates as opposed to the Medicare schedule fee, representing another anomaly. 
Facilitated by provisions of the National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA),128 categories of patients 
in public hospitals were redefined and expanded beyond the two categories used by Medicare which are 
familiar to medical practitioners, inpatients and outpatients. The NHRA describes patients who are not 
admitted to a public hospital variously as “non-admitted patients”, “outpatients” and “emergency 
department patients”. Emergency department patients, from the medical practitioner perspective, may 
be thought of as “outpatients” in the sense they have not been formally admitted to the hospital, but such 
patients cannot legally be billed like other outpatients, although medical practitioners may not 
understand this. This adds another layer of legal complexity for medical practitioners because, in 
addition to understanding the provisions of the MBS, workers’ compensation and PHI schemes, they are 
assumed to also have a sound working knowledge of the NHRA and its interface with the HIA, for it is 
not possible to bill correctly otherwise.129 However, the provisions of the NHRA and the MBS 
sometimes collide130 and it can be difficult to apply both correctly across the continuum of patient care 
in a public hospital setting.131 
Quite apart from the complexity of gapcover schemes in Australia, the stated policy objective of reducing 
patient out-of-pocket costs when they go to hospital has failed.132 It should be noted that much of this 
failure is ultimately a consequence of not understanding the practical impact of the CCC on Australian 
medical billing. 
                                                          
127 The Health Legislation Amendment (Gap Cover Schemes) Act 2000 states the purpose of gapcover schemes is to pay above the 
Medicare schedule fee and all schemes must be approved by the Minister. It is therefore unclear the legal basis upon which the 
PHIs limit reimbursement to the Medicare schedule fee for private patients in public hospitals where a gapcover scheme applies. 
128 National Health Funding Body (NHFB), National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA), (NHFB, 2011) 
<https://www.publichospitalfunding.gov.au/national-health-reform/agreement>. 
129 For example, a patient presenting to a public hospital emergency department may say to a treating medical practitioner that 
he/she has private health insurance and is happy to use it. The medical practitioner may then proceed to bill using the patient’s 
PHI gapcover scheme for services provided, even though the NHRA prohibits it unless the patient was admitted. 
130 For example, telehealth services under Medicare can only be provided to outpatients. A medical practitioner may erroneously 
think emergency department patients are outpatients (because they have not been admitted) and unintentionally claim unlawfully 
to Medicare for telehealth services. 
131 For example, a rehabilitation physician may incorrectly assume she can bill to Medicare for outpatient case conferences after a 
public patient has been discharged home but is continuing to return to the public hospital for outpatient follow up. The MBS states: 
“All care directly related to a public in-patient’s care should be provided free of charge. Where a patient has received in-patient 
treatment in a hospital as a public patient (as defined in Section 3(1) of the Health Insurance Act 1973), routine and non-routine 
aftercare directly related to that episode of admitted care will be provided free of charge as part of the public hospital service, 
regardless of where it is provided, on behalf of the state or territory as required by the National Healthcare Agreement. In this case 
no Medicare benefit is payable.” 
132 J Doggett, Healthcare’s Out-of-Pocket Crisis <https://insidestory.org.au/healthcares-out-of-pocket-crisis/>. 
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THIRD-PARTY INVOLVEMENT IN MEDICARE BILLING 
In some respects Medicare operates like the Australian tax system in that taxpayers are personally 
responsible for the information they lodge with the Australian Tax Office irrespective of who prepared 
their tax return. Similarly, medical practitioners are prima facie responsible for every Medicare bill 
submitted in their name, even though someone else may have prepared and lodged the bill on their 
behalf.133 
The impact of third-party conduct in relation to MBS billing is of great significance because in 
contemporary practice most medical practitioners do not administer their own billing, this being 
traditionally delegated to office staff and other third parties. Until recently, medical practitioners had 
sole legal responsibility for medical billing with the exception of cases of criminal fraud.134 However, 
on 1 July 2018 s 82 of the HIA was amended with an expanded definition of inappropriate practice which 
brought corporate entities within the purview of the Medicare watchdog, the Professional Services 
Review (PSR), which is discussed below. The purpose of the amendment was to enhance the PSR’s 
ability to review third-party involvement in Medicare billing. 
This change to the law recognises that increasing corporatisation of medical practice could potentially 
be playing a role in the rising incidence of incorrect MBS billing, particularly in circumstances where 
employed or contracted medical practitioners are contractually bound or incentivised to meet targets or 
provide certain services to support the financial objectives of the corporate owner. Corporate owners 
and the Practice Managers they employ, may not necessarily be medically qualified and may have little 
understanding of Medicare billing requirements, focusing only on the value of each item in the schedule, 
rather than the important compliance provisions contained in the broader regulatory scheme.135 
In addition to influence from corporate owners, medical practitioners seek and receive information 
concerning fees and billing from numerous other third parties one of which is the Australian Medical 
Association (AMA) which has maintained its own schedule of medical fees for over 40 years. The AMA 
schedule has its own codes, some of which map to the MBS and some of which do not, and has quasi-
legal status in that it is the basis for the gazetted rates under many of the various State and Territory 
workers compensation schemes.136 However, inconsistencies between the AMA schedule and the MBS 
may further contribute to erroneous MBS billing by medical practitioners.137 
Adding further confusion is a third reference widely used by Australian anaesthetists, who are directed 
to the ASA Relative Value Guide (RVG) which was developed partly in response to the ambiguity and 
                                                          
133 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 81 <http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/hia1973164/s81.html>, defines persons able to be investigated, and describes a list of 
professionals who have eligibility to claim under the Medicare scheme. 
134 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 81(2). 
135 For example, a corporate medical practice workflow may provide that all patients attending the practice will each have an 
electrocardiogram, a cardiac stress test and an echocardiogram before seeing a cardiologist. While efficient operationally, it is 
arguable that none of these tests, which would draw a total of approximately $350 from the public purse, could properly be 
characterised as clinically relevant, when the patients have not seen a clinician (the cardiologist) prior to having them. This type 
of inappropriate billing may again be outside of the direct control of the medical practitioner, instead being directed and controlled 
by corporate business owners and other third parties, though the medical practitioner remains primarily responsible. 
136 The AMA schedule of fees is copyrighted to the AMA is not publically available. It can only be accessed upon the payment of 
a licence fee for any medical practitioner who wishes to avail it. Services listed in the AMA schedule are a combination of all 
MBS services, together with additional services which do not correspond to the MBS but which the AMA has deemed as being 
legitimate, separately chargeable services. 
137 For example, the AMA permits charges to be raised for telephone consultations, whereas the MBS does not. Another example 
is the AMA is of the view that a separate item for the provision of a steroid injection is available to medical practitioners whereas 
Medicare disagrees and some years ago removed it from the MBS. However, for medical practitioners who may regularly refer to 
both schedules in relation to daily billing activity, this may cause an unintentionally fraudulent claim to be raised by a medical 
practitioner who incorrectly thinks that bulk billing an attendance and also charging separately for a steroid injection is permitted 
because the AMA suggests it is, whereas under Medicare, such practice would constitute a crime. 
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inconsistencies in many of the descriptions of unique anaesthetic services in the MBS.138 However, a 
review of its contents reveals that it may create further confusion for medical practitioners. In some 
cases, descriptions relating to a single professional service are inconsistent as between the MBS, the 
AMA Schedule and the RVG.139 Yet for Australian anaesthetists who will be held personally responsible 
should they choose the wrong interpretation, there appears to be nowhere to go to seek reliable advice 
and support when the three resources provide conflicting information in the context of a billing decision. 
Another common third party involved in Medicare billing is public hospital finance departments, 
because RoPP agreements typically include clauses requiring medical practitioners to appoint the 
hospital as sole agent for all private Medicare billing as well as giving exclusive use of relevant provider 
numbers to the hospital to facilitate this activity. Entering into these arrangements is a condition of 
employment at the hospital, there being usually no option for the medical practitioner to negotiate the 
specific terms, which effectively hand over the entire administration of billing to hospital staff who 
themselves may have little knowledge or expertise in this area. Yet the medical practitioner retains 
personal responsibility for the veracity of submitted bills, though not the income, which is usually 
retained by the hospital. 
More recently, over 20,000 medical practitioners seeking answers to the complexities of medical billing 
have formed a closed Facebook group in which the founder, a medical practitioner, has self-declared 
herself as a medical billing expert.140 The basis of this declaration appears to be that the medical 
practitioner has read the MBS and some provisions of the HIA. While commendable, it is somewhat 
concerning that having never been formally taught how to bill correctly, a medical practitioner is 
assuming expert status and providing medical billing advice to other medical practitioners under a 
shroud of secrecy.141 However, with nowhere to go to obtain reliable advice and support in relation to 
Medicare billing it is perhaps not surprising that groups such as this have appeared and that the 
government currently has no ability to intervene because there is no legal barrier to anyone declaring 
themselves a medical billing expert and providing education to others on how to extract public money 
from the Medicare purse. This is inconsistent with other areas of public financing such as taxation where 
only accountants, tax lawyers and, as a bare minimum, registered tax agents, are permitted to hold 
themselves out as being experts in the area of taxation. 
With no formal education on medical billing occurring throughout their medical training, medical 
practitioners are vulnerable to adopting direction from numerous third parties who declare themselves 
experts on the topic of medical billing. This may even extend to financial advisers and accountants, 
software vendors who may offer prompts or short cuts in the billing process such as predictive billing, 
as well as practice managers and receptionists who themselves have no formal training in this complex 
area. 
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF MEDICARE 
                                                          
138 Anaesthetic services are largely time based, with each unit of time having a dollar value. No other medical specialty in Australia 
claims in this way. The RVG is available exclusively to members in hardcopy, online PDF and as an App. Currently in its 19th 
edition, the RVG is heavily relied upon by Australian anaesthetists <https://asa.org.au/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/Advertising/MediaPack2018RVG.pdf>. 
139 MBS item 17615 is an unreferred anaesthetic consultation involving complex assessment and management plan. The 
corresponding service in the AMA schedule is CA004 which the AMA describes as being equivalent to both of MBS items 17615 
and 17645 but does not involve complexity or a management plan. The same service in the ASA (which borrows from both the 
MBS and the AMA) cross-references the complexity in the MBS but is silent on referrals and management plan. Depending on 
which source is chosen, an anaesthetist could reasonably interpret the various provisions and claim daily pre-anaesthetic 
consultations on a post-operative patient without a referral or management plan. 
140 GP Loses Court Challenge on 80/20 <https://www.ausdoc.com.au/news/gp-loses-court-challenge-8020-rule> see in particular 
comments by one doctor who self proclaimed expert status. 
141 Business for Doctors <https://www.facebook.com/businessfordoctors/>. 
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The Early Days 
Medicare’s fee for service payment arrangements rely heavily on the honesty of medical practitioners to 
claim correctly. Aware of the inherent vulnerabilities of the new national insurance scheme, Medibank’s 
founders established the Medical Services Committee of Inquiry (MSCI) which was charged with the 
task of monitoring services claimed under the new scheme and investigating possible breaches and 
referring potential cases of fraud. 
By 1992, following an audit by the Australian National Audit Office, the MSCI had been found to be 
ineffective in deterring incorrect billing by medical practitioners142 and was replaced by the PSR Scheme 
in 1994. The PSR was established as a peer review scheme to examine Medicare services claimed by 
medical practitioners and to determine whether claiming under the MBS constituted inappropriate 
practice. The PSR currently reviews between 50 and 100 practitioners annually. 
The Introduction and Subsequent Review of the PSR 
The objective of the PSR is to protect the public interest in the standard of Medicare and Pharmaceutical 
Benefit Scheme services143 and, in line with other health regulatory policy (eg practitioner regulation), 
the sanctions imposed are intended to be remedial rather than punitive. When findings of inappropriate 
practice are made by the PSR, the penalties imposed are onerous and can include disqualification from 
participating in the Medicare Scheme. 
Unlike other regulated professions, where the names and details of reprimanded or disqualified persons 
are made public,144 PSR decisions are not published, ostensibly to protect the anonymity of errant 
medical practitioners. Unfortunately, this means that PSR decisions do not contribute to a body of 
knowledge which might assist medical practitioners to better understand their compliance obligations 
and prevents the development of doctrinal precedent to inform future decision-making and policy 
direction. Additionally, the PSR annual reports heavily redact case studies of investigated medical 
practitioners, making it possible for a medical practitioner to unknowingly learn medical billing from a 
colleague who has previously been investigated by the PSR. 
The lack of transparency of the PSR is particularly concerning when its own annual reports routinely 
cite practitioner confusion as being a contributing factor in relation to poor MBS compliance.145 During 
his six-year period in the role of PSR Director Tony Webber actively engaged the PSR in Medicare 
compliance education programs for the profession via face-to-face seminars as well as annual reports to 
the profession,146 both suggestive of an awareness of the prevalence of confusion and a need to address 
the issue. There is compelling evidence that high levels of confusion regarding correct Medicare billing 
remain prevalent.147 
During a 2011 Senate Committee inquiry reviewing the PSR,148 submissions from medical practitioners 
highlighted both the complexity of the Medicare billing system and the inadequacies in the resources 
available to them concerning its proper use. These submissions directly contradicted submissions from 
                                                          
142 Bell, n 27. 
143 Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) s 79A. 
144 See legal profession register at this link <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/olsc/nswdr.nsf/webview> and corporate directors and 
financial advisors at this link <https://asic.gov.au/online-services/search-asics-registers/banned-and-disqualified/>. 
145 Commonwealth Department of Health, Professional Services Review, Annual Report (2008-2009) (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2009)  <https://www.psr.gov.au/sites/default/files/PSR_Annual_Report_2008-09.PDF?v=1478693046>. 
146 Australian Government, Professional Services Review Other Publications (Web page, 2019) 
<http://www.psr.gov.au/publications-and-resources/other-publications>. 
147 See 140, see the 161 comments left by readers which demonstrate widespread confusion and one Doctor demonstrated a failure 
to understand the operation of the CCC. 
148 Commonwealth of Australia, Community Affairs References Committee, Review of the Professional Services Review (PSR) 
Scheme, October 2011. 
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Medicare which suggested that ample resources and reliable support were available.149 One submission 
indicated that processes should be in place to enable clinicians to obtain clarity about the use of the MBS 
and another drew a comparison between the advice and written rulings available from the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) and the lack of such information and advice from Medicare, suggesting that this 
meant medical practitioners could unknowingly fall into non-compliance.150 The Senate Committee 
resolved that a “watching brief” should be kept to ensure that optimal educational material and 
information should always be available to practitioners though fell short of detailing who should fulfil 
this obligation.151 It appears that informal, ad hoc training and advice from unqualified individuals, such 
as the closed Facebook group already mentioned, have attempted to fill this void. 
Of major concern is a recent, unprecedented decision taken by the PSR in which it dismissed written 
advice from Medicare, which had been provided to a medical practitioner concerning the billing of a 
particular service. In its deliberations the PSR stated that Medicare’s advice was incorrect152 and in so 
doing, undermined the government as being the authority for correct Medicare billing advice. This 
decision may have effectively closed off the only remaining legitimate avenue of advice and support 
which medical practitioners might reasonably have expected to rely upon for medical billing decisions. 
Government Audits 
In addition to the PSR, as part of the Increased Medicare Compliance Audit Initiative (IMCA), new 
legislation was enacted in 2011 which enhanced Medicare’s audit capabilities.153 
Activity under the new Act commenced in 2012.154 However, a 2014 report by the Auditor General 
indicated that Medicare’s compliance initiatives since 2008 had been largely unsuccessful.155 The report 
acknowledged the complexity of Medicare billing,156 highlighting the need for appropriately skilled 
departmental staff to undertake compliance audit work because the ability to correctly detect inaccurate 
claims requires prerequisite knowledge of accurate claims. However, the auditor found that rather than 
compliance management relying on specific policies or guidelines, the internal operating environment 
of the department consisted largely of unwritten “common knowledge”,157 inconsistency in approaches 
taken and interpretation of service requirements by audit staff,158 accurate claims being falsely recorded 
as inaccurate,159 Medicare debts being inaccurately calculated160 and inappropriate reliance on “local 
                                                          
149 Commonwealth of Australia, Community Affairs References Committee, n 148. 
150 Commonwealth of Australia, Community Affairs References Committee, n 148. 
151 Commonwealth of Australia, Community Affairs References Committee, n 148. 
152 In Nithianantha v Commonwealth of Australia [2018] FCA 2063, [193], the PSR Committee rejected written advice from the 
Provider Services Branch of the Department of Human Services that had been submitted in evidence, saying the advice was “not 
correct”. The medical practitioner had attempted to rely on the written advice to justify a medical billing decision but was 
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knowledge and experience”161 (rather than written, robust internal education programs) all of which was 
“expected to be addressed largely through on-the-job training”.162 It is worth noting that institutional 
protection of this nature suggests a possibly pervasive view within the department that medical 
practitioners have a higher level of legal literacy in regard to correct use of Medicare than Medicare’s 
own staff, who themselves may sometimes not understand the requirements of the scheme, have no 
background or experience in health, and are not subject to penalties if their conduct is non-compliant. 
Education Initiatives 
In 1985, one year after the revived Medibank scheme (renamed Medicare) was introduced, educating 
medical practitioners was again reported as an effective strategy in promoting voluntary compliance.163 
This was echoed in the Auditor General’s report 30 years later in his general acknowledgment that the 
department’s education initiatives were central to overall maintenance of system integrity. 
Further evidence of the importance of medical practitioner education for improving billing compliance 
was seen in 2007, when the then Minister for Human Services announced education as being the key to 
compliance stating that $250 million in program savings had been achieved in the previous year through 
education initiatives which had changed the claiming patterns of practitioners.164 Although the 
Department repeatedly states that education is critical in managing billing compliance prospectively,165 
education initiatives have been generally short-lived, and a recent Australian study found that Australian 
medical practitioners do not now, and have never received formal education on correct billing under 
Medicare.166 
Decreasing Administrative Support 
Despite the combination of greater complexity, increased scope and the substantial growth in the number 
of available medical services and MBS claiming activity over the last 40 years, the administrative and 
support infrastructure of Medicare has declined considerably since its inception. The success of 
Medibank was dependent on the ability of the federal government to prove it could successfully process 
millions of claims from day 1. A dedicated team was established in the Health Insurance Commission 
(HIC) for this purpose.167 The decision to create a separate commission was significant for two reasons. 
The first was to protect the Medibank levy from political whim,168 and the second was a critically 
important structural component designed to establish and retain departmental expertise. HIC staff were 
employed outside of the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth), ensuring long-term retention of essential expert 
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knowledge.169 By establishing a dedicated authority comprising staff who were employed outside of the 
public service, it was predicted that expertise would not be lost with every round of promotions.170 
However, in 2005 the Health Insurance Commission Act 1973 (Cth) was renamed the Medicare 
Australia Act 1973 (Cth) and included reforms that dissolved the HIC as a separate commission and 
established it as an agency of the Department of Human Services. This had a twofold effect: it facilitated 
increased ministerial control over the new agency; and it made all HIC staff employees of Medicare 
Australia under the Public Service Act. The original safeguards, specifically designed to retain 
departmental Medicare expertise, were permanently undone from the moment HIC employees became 
employees under the Public Service Act, because there were no longer any barriers to prevent Medicare 
staff from moving to other departments within the public service. 
In a further dilution of expertise, in 2011, the largest overhaul in public service history was facilitated 
by legislative change which renamed the Medicare Australia Act 1973 (Cth) as the Human Services 
(Medicare) Act 1973 (Cth) and enabled the Department of Human Services to became a single state 
department integrating Centrelink, Medicare, the Child Support Agency and CRS Australia. 
As a result, the necessary infrastructure to support the operation of Medicare (the fourth largest 
expenditure item in the federal budget)171 is now so inadequate that neither compliance nor reform can 
be properly managed. 
The MBS Review Taskforce 
Medicare’s founders anticipated the need for ongoing review and management of subsidised services in 
the scheme, and established the Medicare Benefits Advisory Committee (MBAC) for this purpose. The 
functions of the MBAC are set out in Pt V of the HIA172 and include considering the manner and the 
extent to which a particular service should be included in the Medicare scheme, including applicable 
fees. Composition of the MBAC describes a quorum of five, three of whom must be medical 
practitioners.173 Of note, the role of the MBAC excludes making recommendations beyond clinical 
matters and fees. The committee operates at the professional service level and is not permitted to propose 
changes to the underlying legal structure. 
This notwithstanding, in 2015 the Federal Government established a new body, called the MBS Review 
Taskforce (MBSRT). The stated purpose of the MBSRT is to align Medicare-funded services with 
contemporary clinical evidence174 and the work of the taskforce is nearing completion. The MBAC 
describes a point of differentiation between it and the MBSRT on its website stating its work is mostly 
prospective (assessing applications for new services to be included in the MBS) while the work of the 
MBSRT is largely retrospective,175 although there appears to be some degree of overlap and duplication. 
The MBSRT terms of reference also permitted it to review the underlying legal structure and billing 
rules.176 
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On 1 November 2017, the government accepted sweeping changes to the MBS based on 
recommendations of the MBSRT which may have further obfuscated some of the already opaque legal 
principles discussed in this article. Specifically, rather than referring to the key tenets of clinical 
relevance and necessity, the MBSRT introduced a new concept, that of “reasonableness”,177 stating that 
it was reasonable for two common services to be billed together only if the higher paying service had a 
value under $300 but not if it had a value over $300. An unintended consequence of introducing 
reasonableness as a standard is that clinical relevance has effectively been undermined and avenues for 
the government to prosecute breaches of the scheme may have been further eroded.178 While the response 
of medical practitioners affected by this change is unknown, it would be a pyrrhic victory for the 
government if this somewhat arbitrary $300 cap has been shifted to consumers in the form of higher out-
of-pocket costs or medical practitioners having simply adjusted their billing patterns to maintain their 
incomes. 
Further, for medical practitioners who are required to navigate Medicare’s changing rules, there is no 
clarity around the way the PHIs should apply such rules in a gapcover context. Medicare benefits make 
up approximately half or more of every claim made under a gapcover bill and with no interpretation of 
how such a change is to be applied in that context, there is nothing to prevent a PHI rejecting a claim for 
an attendance and a procedure claimed together when the procedure has a Medicare schedule fee of 
$250, on the basis that once the PHI component is added, the total amount payable is over $300. Despite 
the fact this may not be the intention, there is no practical ability for a medical practitioner to dispute 
such action. Further, the medical practitioner may unintentionally breach PHI scheme requirements 
unknowingly due to the arbitrary and inconsistent application of new Medicare rules by the PHIs. 
It is widely accepted that the MBSRT has done good work in revising clinical descriptions of 
professional services, many of which have not been reviewed for decades. However, there has been less 
support when the MBSRT has ventured into the underlying legal structure and law reform. In a recent 
example, the MBSRT proposed that a certain category of medical practitioners be prevented from billing 
independently.179 The response from industry was swift and brutal, and while the arguments put by 
industry responders (who included medical practitioners) were correct in pointing out the serious 
practical consequences of the proposed changes,180 of more concern was an apparent failure to 
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understand very basic structural elements of the regulatory scheme including the contractual nature of 
the relationship between a doctor and patient. Further it was apparent that the operation of the CCC had 
not been considered or understood because the proposed changes had the potential to expose the 
government to a High Court challenge based on a practical compulsion argument in breach of the CCC. 
CONCLUSION 
Medical billing in Australia has become so convoluted that we are beginning to see signs of the Medicare 
system unravelling. Lax regulation and constant tinkering at the system’s periphery has led to Medicare 
being more vulnerable to abuse and non-compliance than 40 years ago. 
Exacerbating the government’s current challenges are the increasing numbers of organisations self-
declaring as experts who are providing education to medical practitioners on everything from 
“maximising Medicare” to how to “pack and stack” Medicare item numbers.181 In addition, one medical 
practitioner has successfully crowd-funded an ongoing legal action against the government seeking 
declaratory relief against the PSR for procedural unfairness and a denial of natural justice.182 The authors 
of an article published in the Medical Journal of Australia specifically cited compliance with Medicare 
rules as being a contributing factor to medical practitioner burnout and suicide.183 
The rapid pace of relentless change to services and billing rules proposed by the MBSRT and 
implemented by the government is not only inconsistent with international best practice standards,184 but 
is also arguably rendering the Medicare scheme more vulnerable to abuse than ever before. The 
government has little ability to deal effectively with this because it has become almost impossible for 
medical practitioners to have certainty that they are using the Medicare scheme correctly from one day 
to the next. A service successfully billed and paid one day may be rejected the next due to a rule change 
the medical practitioner was unaware of and there is nowhere for the medical practitioner to go to obtain 
reliable advice and support. Yet medical practitioners are expected to know every nuance of the 
labyrinthine and constantly changing Medicare billing rules that they were never taught.185 
Constant changes are also having unintended downstream negative consequences through the PHI 
legislation, workers’ compensation and other third-party payer schemes, the Veterans’ Affairs 
legislation, all the way through to the complex payment arrangements and coding systems that deliver 
funding to Australian hospitals. The ultimate point of impact occurs when a service has been provided 
and a bill is required to be settled between a medical practitioner and a patient. This impact is 
increasingly taking the form of out-of-pocket costs, in a context where Australian consumers, who 
ultimately fund both Medicare and the PHI industry, have no ability to understand or question why they 
are paying again, when they have already paid via their taxes and PHI contributions. 
Fifty years after the Nimmo report, the operation of our health payment arrangements has again become 
unnecessarily complex and beyond the comprehension of many. The levels of trust between medical 
practitioners, PHIs, Medicare, hospitals and patients, in relation to health financing transactions are at a 
record low, and there are no policy solutions in sight. While we continue to run up a down escalator in 
the area of meaningful health reform, ignoring structural weaknesses, the demand for health services 
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will continue apace, out-of-pocket costs will inevitably continue to rise as medical practitioners and 
hospitals circumvent reimbursement barriers and demand up-front payment, private health insurance 
coverage is likely to continue to fall as a result (perceived as poor value by consumers) and the efficient, 
responsive and equitable modernisation of our excellent health system will remain elusive. For the 
medical practitioners required to navigate the increasing complexity, they will remain at risk of 
investigation and prosecution working in a system they cannot avoid, but do not understand. 
